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Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-
TB), strains of Mycobacterium tuberculosis
resistant to the first-line antituberculosis
drugs rifampicin and isoniazid, is a global
public health concern and remains a
leading cause of mortality and morbidity
in low- and middle-income countries [1].
In response, World Health Organization
(WHO) member states have called for
action to ‘‘achieve universal access to
diagnosis and treatment of multidrug-
resistant and extensively drug-resistant
tuberculosis’’ [2]. However, the drive to
eradicate MDR-TB using current strate-
gies remains an uphill battle [3,4]. Exten-
sively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-
TB), a form of MDR-TB with additional
resistance to the backbone of the second-
line antituberculosis regimen—fluoroquin-
olones and injectable agents—has been
officially reported in 92 countries [5].
Making MDR-TB treatment more af-
fordable would be an important step
towards improving patient access to care
and reducing the significant public health
burdens arising from the spread of this
highly contagious airborne disease [6,7].
Here, we assess changes in MDR-TB drug
prices since 2001 and identify limitations
in the current system, focusing on the
barriers to care delivery posed by high
costs of treatment and weak health
systems. Using pneumococcal vaccine as
a case study to inform the fight against the
global tuberculosis (TB) pandemic, we
argue that a market-based strategy cou-
pled with long-term in-country technical
assistance should be utilised to scale up
access to MDR-TB treatment.
Policy Forum articles provide a platform for health
policy makers from around the world to discuss the
challenges and opportunities in improving health
care to their constituencies.
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Summary Points
N Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) is a leading public health concern,
particularly in low- and middle-income countries, necessitating coordinated
international action to prevent its spread and effectively treat the infected.
N The cost of treatment for MDR-TB is over 200 times the comparable cost for a
drug-susceptible tuberculosis (TB) patient. Data show that prices for three of
the currently most expensive drugs have increased dramatically since 2001,
outpacing inflation.
N Many of the high MDR-TB burden countries were ranked by WHO as being in
the bottom 50% of health systems worldwide. Without sufficient technical,
human, and organizational resources, weak health systems can pose a
significant barrier to access to treatment.
N In order to achieve the goal of eradicating MDR-TB, policymakers should
implement a two-pronged intervention that pools donor resources for the
coupling of market-oriented solutions to MDR-TB drug prices and targeted
investments in health systems strengthening and innovative care delivery
models. Innovative policy mechanisms piloted for other infectious diseases,
such as pneumococcal vaccine, may offer lessons for the MDR-TB context.
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Drug Market
The high price of medicines can be a
significant barrier to access to treatment,
particularly in resource-limited settings
[8,9]. In 2000–2001, key stakeholders
launched the Green Light Committee
Initiative (GLC) and Global Drug Facility
(GDF) to promote access to and rational
use of concessionally priced and quality-
assured TB drugs [10,11]. The linked
GLC-GDF mechanism has been successful
in reducing prices for first-line drugs and
for second-line drugs [12]. As a result of
these reforms, the average price of second-
line drugs in low-income countries fell by
38%–92% compared to prices before these
reforms. However, shortages and delays of
quality-assured MDR-TB drugs have since
become a recurring problem, notably of
para-aminosalicylate sodium (PAS) in 2006
and capreomycin in 2007 and 2011 [13].
Data from WHO and the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malar-
ia (‘‘Global Fund’’) show that prices for
three of the currently most expensive
drugs—PAS, cycloserine, and capreomy-
cin—have increased significantly since
2001 (Figures 1 and 2). Consequently,
for an MDR-TB patient, the nominal
cost of second-line antituberculosis med-
icines can be over 200 times greater than
the comparable cost for a drug-suscepti-
ble TB patient [14]. While most low-
income, high-burden countries receive
funding for their MDR-TB treatment
programmes from the Global Fund,
thereby allowing these countries to offer
medicines at no cost to patients, the
country-level organization and delivery
costs can represent a substantial propor-
tion of the total budget for national TB
programmes, and may thus still hinder
country-driven scale-up of treatment
[15]. Because many of these same
medicines are associated with serious
adverse events, their use necessitates the
additional costs of close laboratory and
clinical follow-up [16,17].
These increases in second-line drug
prices—despite substantial price reductions
seen as part of the 2000–2001 reforms—
highlight the complexity of maintaining
affordable prices in the MDR-TB market.
One explanation may be the small and, in
some cases, declining number of quality-
assured suppliers of second-line drugs
[13,18]. Equally, market-based solutions
must be tied to delivery interventions to
ensure that infected patients are adequately
identified and treated in sufficient scale to
offset price reductions. Without meaningful
Figure 1. Prices for a month’s treatment of selected second-line agents in 2001 and 2011. Prices are given in constant 2011 dollars.
Percentages indicate changes between highest actual and lowest quoted prices. GDF=Global Drug Facility. GF=Global Fund grant recipients.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001738.g001
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terised by low volumes and high manufac-
turing costs, central authorities will likely
find it increasingly difficult to use negotia-
tion alone to sustain reduced prices for
MDR-TB drugs.
Market-Shaping Strategies in
Other Disease Contexts: Case
Study of Pneumococcal Vaccine
As with MDR-TB, concerns over the cost
of treatment and burden of disease plagued
pneumococcal vaccine efforts. An ‘‘ad-
vanced market commitment’’ (AMC) was
proposed in 2005 to encourage market entry
and rapid scale-up of pneumococcal vaccine
use in low- and middle-income countries
[19]. Under this programme, participating
manufacturers are subsidised proportionate-
ly to their supply commitment, with a high
price guaranteed for the first two years to
incentivise investments in manufacturing
capacity and research and development.
For the remaining years of the programme,
participating suppliers are paid a lower ‘‘tail
price’’ to cover the marginal costs of
production, of which Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)-sup-
ported countries pay a copayment of $0.20
or more per dose, depending on their
national income; the remainder is paid by
GAVI funds [20]. In return, manufacturers
commit to supply actual demand or their
committed supply level, whichever is lower.
In 2007, a consortium of donors, includ-
ing the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
pledged a total of $1.5 billion for a goal of
200 million doses of pneumococcal vaccine
annually by 2015. In the first three years of
the programme, the number of high-
income countries with the second-genera-
tion pneumococcal vaccine was roughly
twice that of low-income countries, com-
pared with a ratio of nearly 9 to 1 for the
first generation version [21]. However, the
programme has faced a number of chal-
lenges. GAVI has acknowledged that it will
not be able to meet demand for some
participating countries due to shortfalls in
short-term supply availability. Some have
also questioned whether GAVI had nego-
tiated sufficiently on price [22].
Nonetheless, the case study of pneu-
mococcal disease illuminates best prac-
tices in ensuring access to essential
medicines and vaccines, whilst also
incentivising market entry and manufac-
turer investments in research and devel-
opment (R&D). However, there are a
number of important differences between
the pneumococcal vaccine case and
MDR-TB treatment. First, there are
limited incentives for manufacturer in-
terest in the MDR-TB market, which is
characterised by low volumes, high
disease burden in poor countries, and
highly variable demand. Second, unlike
vaccination-based health interventions,
MDR-TB treatment typically involves
greater time, more resources, and higher
organizational and delivery investments,
particularly relating to the duration of
treatment monitoring.
Health Systems and Challenges
to Care Delivery
In addition to the costs of treatment, it
has become clear in recent years that
‘‘demand side’’ factors also play an
important role in defining access to
MDR-TB treatment and the size of the
market for second-line antituberculosis
drugs. Data from the Global Fund show
that some high-burden countries have
returned monies because they do not have
the capacity to absorb it. For example,
Nigeria and Indonesia are two lower-
middle–income countries that have re-
ceived substantial funding from the Global
Fund for their national TB programmes.
Yet, between 2010 and 2012, Nigeria and
Indonesia had drawn only 60% and 50%,
respectively, of the TB-specific funds
allocated to it by the Global Fund [23].
In fact, the Global Fund reports suggested
that the reason allocated funds were not
used was because of major delays in
carrying out programme activities such as
the signing of grant contracts with sub-
recipients, launch of media campaigns,
and procurement of diagnostic materials.
Indeed, a closer look at the high MDR-
TB burden countries reveals that the vast
Figure 2. WHO recommended MDR-TB regimens, by contribution of mean cost of drug. Authors’ analysis of Doctors without Borders
(MSF) data (see [14]). Proportions are calculated relative to the total cost of the regimen, and may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001738.g002
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by the WHO as being in the bottom 50%
of health systems worldwide (Table 1).
Without sufficient technical, human, and
organizational resources, weak health sys-
tems can pose a significant barrier to
access to treatment. In several countries,
the integration of tuberculosis services into
primary care and HIV interventions
remains lacking, which is troubling since
poor access to healthcare can lead to low
treatment success [24]. In addition, a focus
on hospital-based treatment may severely
limit treatment access. Emphasising inpa-
tient treatment can alienate patients, who
must sacrifice up to two years of forgone
productivity because of hospitalisation,
while also placing further strains on
hospital systems and the health workforce
[25].
Recommendations
The persistently high cost of a full 24-
month course of chemotherapy raises
important questions about international
efforts to ensure affordable MDR-TB care.
Moreover, weak health systems are pres-
ent in many of the high-burden countries,
meaning that market interventions focused
on price alone are unlikely to address the
root causes of global deficits in MDR-TB
treatment and control. Hence, charting a
new course forward for the global move-
ment to eradicate drug-resistant TB
should follow a two-pronged approach:
pooling donor resources for the coupling
of market-oriented solutions to MDR-TB
drug prices and targeted investments in
health systems strengthening and innova-
tive care delivery models.
A coordinated, evidence-based public
health intervention for MDR-TB could
include the following components
(Box 1).
Table 1. Disease burden and health and economic characteristics of the 27 high-burden MDR-TB countries.
Country
Est. number of
MDR-TB patients
(’000)
% est. MDR-TB
cases enrolled on
treatment
Health system overall
performance ranking
Public spending
on health Living on ,$1.25/day
(N=191; 1997) (% of GDP) (2002–2011)
Africa
D.R. Congo 2,900 6% 188 3.4 87.7
Ethiopia 2,100 14% 180 2.6 39.0
Nigeria 3,600 3% 187 1.9 68.0
South Africa 8,100 80% 175 3.9 13.8
Europe and Eastern Mediterranean
Armenia 250 40% 104 1.8 ,1
Azerbaijan 2,800 15% 109 1.2 ,1
Belarus 2,200 .90% 72 4.4 ,1
Bulgaria 100 36% 102 3.7 ,1
Estonia 70 77% 77 4.7 ,1
Georgia 630 .90% 114 2.4 15.3
Kazakhstan 8,800 82% 64 2.5 ,1
Kyrgyzstan 1,800 27% 151 3.5 6.2
Latvia 120 86% 105 4.1 ,1
Lithuania 300 .90% 73 5.2 ,1
Pakistan 11,000 10% 122 0.8 21.0
Rep. of Moldova 1,700 50% 101 5.4 ,1
Russia 46,000 40% 130 3.2 ,1
Tajikistan 910 59% 154 1.6 6.6
Ukraine 6,800 .90% 79 4.4 ,1
Uzbekistan 4,000 37% 117 2.8 –
Southeast Asia and Western Pacific
Bangladesh 4,200 12% 88 1.2 43.3
China 59,000 3% 144 2.7 13.1
India 64,000 22% 112 1.2 32.7
Indonesia 6,900 6% 92 1.3 18.1
Myanmar 6,000 7% 190 0.2 –
Philippines 13,000 15% 60 1.3 18.4
Vietnam 3,800 19% 160 2.6 40.1
MDR-TB prevalence and treatment enrolment statistics are from the 2013 Global TB Report by the World Health Organization [5] and represent notified cases of TB. The
total burden of MDR-TB may be higher than these estimates. Health systems rankings are from the WHO’s World Health Report 2010, Annex, table 10. The systems
ranking was discontinued by the WHO in 2000 and has not been updated since then. Poverty statistics are from the 2013 Human Development Report by the United
Nations Development Programme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001738.t001
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line drugs
A global strategic reserve supply (or
stockpile) of second-line drugs could reduce
short-term demand variability and prevent
shortages of second-line drugs. In Decem-
ber 2013, UNITAID announced $15
million in funding to expand the Strategic
Rotating Stockpile (SRS) for MDR-TB
medicines. However, the scale of the
existing SRS remains limited, covering an
estimated 5,800 MDR-TB treatments [26].
The planned transition of the SRS to the
Global Fund by the end of2014 presents an
opportunity for the international commu-
nity to evaluate ways that the strategic
stockpile could address some of the market
challenges described herein.
Although it currently acts as a purchaser of
last resort, the SRS could play a greater role
in negotiations with manufacturers of second-
line drugs. For example, the Global Fund
and international partners could commit to
supplying the SRS with a fixed percentage of
all drug volumes procured by GDF, thereby
‘‘topping up’’ orders made through the GLC-
GDF mechanism. While the implementation
of a pooled purchasing strategy would need
to be carefully defined, GDF and the SRS
could look to the example of the Clinton’s
Health Access Initiative and the United
States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief, which have successfully used their
position as major purchasers of a wide range
of medicines on behalf of developing coun-
tries to not only negotiate favourable prices
for their beneficiaries but also meaningfully
reduce demand-side uncertainty for manu-
facturers [27].
Advance purchase commitments
and parallel review
Given the prospect of the first new
treatment agents for MDR-TB in decades,
an expanded SRS mechanism could also
be utilised by donors to pilot an advance
purchase commitment for MDR-TB,
modelled after the AMC for pneumococ-
cal vaccine. For example, the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) recently
approved bedaquiline (Sirturo), a novel
diarylquinoline, for the treatment of
MDR-TB [28]. Similarly, in November
2013, the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) approved delamanid (Deltyba), a
nitro-dihydro-imidazooxazole derivative,
for treatment of MDR-TB patients with-
out other treatment options because of
resistance or tolerability [29]. To prevent
shortages associated with the introduction
of new technologies in resource-limited
settings, in coordination with other do-
nors, the SRS could commit to purchasing
sufficient doses of a new drug to treat
identified MDR-TB patients. Drawing on
their expertise, the Global Fund and its
partners, including nongovernmental and
community organisations, could also co-
ordinate with manufacturers to streamline
the delivery of new medicines to patients
and providers in high-burden TB coun-
tries. In turn, these commitments could
further stimulate investments in R&D for
new treatments for MDR-TB by guaran-
teeing a market for safe and effective
products [30].
In addition, the WHO and Global Fund
could explore the creation of a parallel
review process, in which WHO review
occurs simultaneously with negotiations
for these advance purchase commitments.
One precedent for such a process arose in
the US in 2011 when the FDA and the
Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices, a large public payer, launched a
pilot programme for the parallel review of
medical devices for approval and coverage
[31].
Novel models of technical assistance
It is critical that the above interven-
tions occur in parallel to address health
system barriers to MDR-TB treatment
[3,4], specifically building systems capa-
ble of diagnosing infected patients,
rapidly initiating treatment, and reliably
delivering care throughout their treat-
ment. Despite the provision of short-
term technical assistance through vari-
ous global mechanisms, many countries
remain unable to mount the type of
health intervention required to treat
MDR-TB at scale, as demonstrated by
the Nigeria and Indonesia examples. In
2008, the US Institute of Medicine
recognized the challenge in expanding
access to treatment of MDR-TB without
building enduring in-country capacity
[32]. Long-term on-site technical assis-
tance should draw on the experience of
successful regional treatment pro-
grammes and would be particularly
meaningful for countries seeking to
augment capacity in performing myco-
bacterial culture, drug susceptibility
testing, and rapid molecular genetic
tests for MDR-TB [32].
Conclusion
Achieving the three goals of access,
affordability, and sustainability in the
MDR-TB context is a public health
imperative. Novel financing mecha-
nisms, such as advance purchase agree-
ments and a global strategic stockpile,
are necessary to improve the affordabil-
ity of and access to MDR-TB treat-
ment—in turn, improving the efficiency
of use of country and donor resources.
In parallel, any novel financing mecha-
nism must also address the implemen-
tation gap affecting MDR-TB scale-up,
such as through targeted investments in
health systems strengthening and inno-
vative care delivery models.
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Box 1. A Global Intervention for MDR-TB Treatment Access
1. Global strategic stockpile. A strategic stockpile could reduce short-term
demand variability, prevent shortages of second-line drugs, and strengthen
negotiations with manufacturers.
2. Advance purchase commitments. A high-profile commitment could ensure
that all patients can access safe and effective treatments entering the market,
whilst also potentially stimulating investments in research and development for
new treatments for MDR-TB.
3. Technical assistance. Novel models of technical assistance that build in-
country health systems capacity are essential to not only sustain any price
reductions but also reliably diagnose infected patients and deliver care
throughout their treatment.
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